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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20040838 - CA

vs.
JOSEPH E. FERRERI,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for Custodial Interference, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004).
TABLE OF DETERMINATIVE
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (2004) is determinative and provides:
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child
under the age of 16 from its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian:
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer
than the parent-time or custody period previously awarded by
a court of competent jurisdiction.
1

(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if,
having actual physical custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a
judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction which grants to another
person parent-time, visitation, or custody rights, and without good cause the
actor conceals or detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of
lawful parent-time, visitation, or custody rights.
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is removed
and taken from one state to another, in which case it is a felony of the third
degree.
This and any other provision cited in the body of this brief are reproduced in
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
On or about March 22, 2004, the State of Utah filed an Amended
Information against Defendant alleging:
Count I- Custodial Interference, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (2004), occurring on or about March 18,
2004.
R. 10-11. After Defendant's Initial Appearance and one Pretrial Conference,
Defendant demanded a trial by jury, which the Court scheduled for August 23,
2004. R. 27. On August 23rd and 24th, 2004, a jury of six persons convicted
Defendant of one count of Custodial Interference, a class A misdemeanor. R. 57.
Defendant filed an appeal of his conviction on or about September 22, 2004. R. 689.

2

Summary of Facts
Defendant and his ex-spouse, Ms. Billie Rogers ("Rogers"), were married in
August, 2000. R. 82:71. The marriage produced one child, Jaycee ("Jaycee"), in
2001 and ended by divorce in January, 2003. R. 82:73. The Sixth District Court
(the "Court") presided over the parties' divorce and awarded Jaycee's physical
custody to Rogers, yet reserved weekly visitation to Defendant. R 82:74.
Defendant's actions, leading to the charge before this Court, are little more
than a continuation of a history of frivolous acts conducted by Defendant.
Subsequent to the parties' divorce, Defendant filed three Orders to Show Cause
against Rogers. SE-4:5. In the Court's Findings and Order, the Court found that
Defendant's "allegations and these Orders to Show Cause [were] not brought in
good faith and the allegations [had] no merit." Id. Ultimately, the Court awarded
attorneys fees to Rogers as a result of Defendant's filings. Id.
Defendant's visitations with Jaycee took place following the divorce,
although not without various episodes of strain and confusion. R. 82:74, 215; R.
83:35-6. Such strain and confusion is evidenced by the prophylactic measures
each party took during the exchange of Jaycee at visitation pick-up and drop-offs.
R. 82:86-8; R. 83:35-6.
While living with Rogers, Jaycee enjoyed a good relationship with her
grandfather, referring to him as her "Poppa." R. 82:173. Usually, at the time of
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Defendant's pick-up of Jaycee, Rogers Ji I 11 , »l physically 1 tai id Jaycee to
Defendant; inst

juher Mr. Rogers, or Rogers' step-father, Clayton Despain

("Despain"), effectuated the transfer of Jaycee to the Defendant. R. 82:104.
Defendant received Jaycee at the Rogers' home from Despain on numerous
occasions. R. 82:173.
Sometime in mid-February, 2004, Rogers Iittsband, A
empl« .

*<

new

ng. R. 82:80. The Rogers family searched for a residence

near Mr. Rogers' new employment eventually finding a home in Kemmer,
Wyoming. R.82:80-l. Rogers did not dispute that Defendant had rights to visit
Jaycee. R. 82:81. Further, she did not believe the move would substantially affect
Defendant's right to visitation as, according to Rogers, the difference ii i tra\ el tin le
from

^ouui joidan to Kemmer, Wyoming was

only approximately fifteen minutes. R. 82:81.
Rogers testified that soon after finding a residence she provided Defendant
with notice of the family's pending move, utwo or three times in person." FL
82:81. However, Defendan; u ••. not accept Rogers' notice always tolling ini lo
"pul

iting." R. 135-8 and SE 6. Rogers claimed she sent Defendant notice

by virtue of a certified letter sent on or about March 9, 2004. R. 82:81, DE 1.
After receiving notice that the Rogers family planned a move to Wyoming,
Defendant continued to exercise his right to visitation with Jaycee. On March 2,

4

2004, Defendant traveled to the Rogers' home with Mr. Harry Zieber - an
acquaintance of Defendant's, who went with Defendant to observe the pickup of
Jaycee from the Rogers' home in Gunnison, Utah. R.83:34-5. Defendant returned
Jaycee to Gunnison on March 4, 2004. R.83:168. Next, on March 10, 2004,
Defendant traveled to the Rogers' home accompanied by Mr. Steven Jorgensen
("Jorgensen"), a friend of Defendant's who again went with Defendant to observe
Jaycee's pickup. R. 83:44, 83:49. Jorgensen observed that the Rogers family
appeared to be preparing to move as evidenced by a horse trailer in the front yard
with some pieces of furniture and some boxes loaded inside. R. 83:46. No
testimony or evidence was provided by either party that any conflict occurred
when Defendant returned Jaycee to Rogers.
On or about March 12, 2004, Defendant filed an Exparte Motion for
Temporary Order ("the Exparte Motion") and an Affidavit in Support of Ex Parte
Order in the Sixth Judicial District Court. SE 4 and SE 3. Later, the same day,
Sixth District Court Judge, David Mower, who was not the judge assigned to the
matter, denied Defendant's Exparte Motion. SE 5. On March 17, 2004, the
assigned judge, Judge K.L. Mclff, confirmed Judge Mower's denial of Defendant
Exparte Motion, then faxed and mailed said denial to Defendant's counsel. SE 5.
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Tuesday, Marc I 11

" ' M it approxin ady 6:00 pm, Defendant and his

friend, Maurine Smith Ramos arrived at Rogers' home in Gunnison to pickup
Jay cee and exercise his visitation rights. R 82:102. Rogers was at home with her
stepfather, Despain, packing items in preparation for her family's upcoming move.
R 82:102. Many packed boxes were stacked in the house and some itei ns vv ere still
loaded into

<

-,•:•>•

.e.

K. 5Z:IUJ>.

!

television,

phone, and iniscellant ^^ personal items remained in the home. R. 82:103.
Rogers' packing was not complete. R. 82:103.
Defendant came to the Rogers' front door to pick up Jay cee. Despain
answered the door and presented Jaycee to Defendant while Rogers remained in
the kitchen. R. 82:104. % i s- i defendant received Jaycee, Despain closed dmr door
and rvtiimnj t<» assisting Rogers' preparation to move. R. 82:104.
Rogers expected Defendant to return Jaycee to her home around 7:00 pm on
Thursday, March 18 . R. 82:105-6. However, Defendant failed to return Jaycee
to the Rogers residence during the evening of March 18th, nor d

efendant

contact Rogers to explaii I such failure. R. 82: 111. Rogers coi itacted h t.
enforcement and reported Defendant's failure to return Jaycee sometime around
i t

8:30 pm on March 18 . R. 82:108. Rogers received no communications from
Defendant until approximately 11:00 am the following day. R. 82:111. At that
time, Defendant called Rogers and explained that he was not returning Jaycee to

Rogers' home in Gunnison. R. 82:112. Defendant did not return Jaycee to the
Rogers' home on Friday, March 19th. R. 82:105-8.
Law enforcement sought an arrest warrant for Defendant, which was signed
by Sixth District Court Judge David Mower late in the afternoon of March 18,
2004. R. 82:197.
Additionally, on or about March 18, 2004, Defendant filed a Verified
Petition for Child Protective Order ("the Verified Petition") in the Third Judicial
District Court. DE 11. In filing the Second Motion, Defendant indicated that he
had not filed for a protective order in the Third Judicial District or any other
District in the State of Utah and that "no cases of any type (divorce, custody, other
protective orders, etc.)...[had] been filed in any court." DE 11. The Third District
Court denied Defendant's Motion approximately one-half-hour later. Def. Brief
Egd7.
On Saturday, March 20, 2004, law enforcement officers located Defendant,
arrested him, and recovered Jaycee. Rogers traveled to a location in or near
Draper, Utah and picked up Jaycee, then returned to Gunnison. R.82:114.
Subsequently, Rogers moved to Kemmer, Wyoming. Defendant never
exercised his right to visitation while Rogers lived in Kemmer. R. 82:81. Instead,
Defendant threatened to sue the Rogers, had well-child checks performed on the
family and insisted that he was not legally able to leave the State of Utah. R.

7

82:128. Rogers testified that she explored Defei* .*-! i

i

false. See R. 82:129.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State contends that Defendant's Brief is flawed due to his failure to
marshal evidence in support of the trial court's ruling prior to attacking it. Based

cause to detain Jaycee from Rogers, especially in context of three district court
judges denying Defendant's baseless attempts to retain custody of Jaycee. Further,
the jury found that Defendant's detention of the child was in fact substantially
longer than his allowed parent time. The day following Jaycee5s expected return,
< • • • • • J \ u I ' {sic)

Defendant called Rogers an
Defend:int was arrested <

aen Rogers traveled to Salt Lake County to retrieve

her daughter. Finally, three of Defendant's four arguments are based on the jury's
verdict, which this Court should affirm unless it finds that reasonable minds could
not have reached such verdict. Additionally, the Court did not err by expunging a
sexually

large against Despain. Cou

emonstrate lliit ;m h

expungement never occurred. Thus, this Court should affirm the totality of
Defendant's conviction.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS
BEFORE ATTACKING THEM.
The Utah Court of Appeals has consistently reminded the party attacking a

lower court's findings of the requirement that all evidence in support of the lower
court decision must be marshaled and then attacked. Specifically, the Court has
stated:
A critical requirement of appellate advocacy is the duty to marshal the evidence
when challenging the trial court's finding of fact. In doing so, the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App. 223, f 13, 51 P.3d 52 (citing West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis
in original). Additionally, the Court of Appeals has held:
A party who challenges the trial court's factual findings ""must marshal all of
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack."" This heavy burden places a
responsibility on counsel that is not unlike becoming a devil's advocate. Counsel
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very finding the
appellant resists."

9

State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, U 6, Jf> P h\ r ^ l (ulntinn\ mi m tied! | In his
Brief, Defendant presents four arguments for this Court to review. Defendant
commences each argument by providing a fact or two to give context to his
argument, then directly launches into his argument - which, oft times is little more
than a repetition of a previous argument. At other junctures in Defendant

tef,

material facts supporting the lo^ <.

t's findings are e> \v<\\ ; u>LX-UK-,.

I Hi iiiiaft/ly, f >efen*i;iiil is entire!

. -,t ..rt.p with this Court's prior rulings, as

Defendant's Brief fails in every respect to marshal even one ounce of evidence in
support of the lower court's findings. As a result, this Court should reject
Defendant's appeal and affirm the lower court decision.
II.

THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EV1DENC1 TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT, WHICH INCLUDES THE
INFERENCE THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE
TO DETAIN JAYCEE.
The evidence presented to the jury showed that Rogers and her family, were

preparing to move from Gunnison, Utah, to Kemmer, Wyoming, due to a change in
Mr. Rogers' employment. R. 82:78-81, 121. The evidence showed t!lat Rogers
had a horse trailei

!

ith boxes and other boxes were

stacked both inside and outside of her home. R. 82:103-5. Rogers told the jury
that Mr. Rogers searched for a new residence in the Kemmer, Wyoming area, but
encountered difficulties in locating an appropriate residence. R. 82:80-1.
Additionally, a defense witness testified that when she and Defendant arrived to

pick up Jaycee on March 18 , the home appeared to look dark and that Clayton
Despain was seen at Rogers' home at that time. R. 83:26-7. Rogers attempted to
provide Defendant with notice of her move on more than one occasion. R. 82: 845. At one point, she did tell Defendant that her family was moving out of state,
approximately 142 miles from Defendant's home, and that she could not provide
him with an address. R. 83: 38.
a. Appeal courts hold jury verdicts in high regard, not interrupting
such verdict absent a showing of insufficient evidence to support
such verdict.
Defendant contends in three of his four arguments that the Defendant's jury
erred in their verdict. See Defs Brief. It is the responsibility of the jury to
evaluate the evidence presented at trial and give its own weight to the evidence in
rendering its verdict. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177, 186 (Utah
2000). The appeals court will "not lightly overturn a jury verdict." See State v.
McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). Additionally, "a verdict rendered by a
jury is overturned only if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." Colwell, 994 P.2d at 186.
The Court should review the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to
the verdict. See McClain, 706 P.2d at 605; State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444
(Utah 1983). Finally, when elements of the crime can be reasonably made from
the evidence, including any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, the
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Court should stop its inquiry and sustain the jury's verdict. See McClain, 706 P.2d
at 605; State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496,498 (Utah 1985).
While the jury heard evidence of Rogers' move and the conditions of her
home on March 18, 2004, it did not find such conditions sufficient to provide
Defendant with good cause to detain Jaycee from Rogers. Testimony was
presented that such conditions existed during Defendant's pickup of Jaycee during
previous weeks, each time Rogers was there when Defendant returned Jaycee. See
Def. Brief at 12-3. Simply stated, after hearing the evidence presented at trial the
jury was not convinced that based on the appearance of Rogers' home and the fact
that she planned an upcoming move provided Defendant with "good cause" to
detain Jaycee.
b. Even if Rogers failed to provide proper notice to Defendant, the
appropriate recourse lies in the civil court, not unjustified detention
of the child.
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-37 (2004) in pertinent part provides:
When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more
from the residence specified in the court's decree, that parent shall provide if
possible 60 days advance written notice of the intended relocation to the other
parent. The written notice of relocation shall contain statements affirming the
following:
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved by
both parties will be followed; and
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to
court ordered parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by
both parties.

12

Defendant relies on the proposition that U.C.A. § 30-3-37, "requires the
moving custodial party to give sixty (60) days written notice of which state the
party is moving to and what the current address will be.'* Defs Brief at 12.
Undoubtedly, U.C.A. § 30-3-37 required Rogers to provide Defendant notice of
her move because her relocation was outside Utah's boundaries. U.C.A. § 30-3-37
includes "[the moving parent] shall provide if possible 60 days advance written
notice..." The key modifier under the statute is "if possible." Rogers testified, not
only that she gave Defendant oral notice "two or three times in person," but that
she sent Defendant notice by certified mail. R. 82:81. Although the family had
not located a suitable residence until mid-March, not within the sixty day
timeframe as required by U.C.A. § 30-3-37, Rogers made every effort to provide
notice to Defendant as soon as possible. R. 82:82-3. Thus, when Defendant asked
Rogers to give him an address, Rogers replied that she couldn't provide an address,
because at that time her family had not made a decision as to what specific city or
home in which they would reside. See R. 82:84, 132. However, nowhere under
the pertinent statute is the requirement that Rogers provide Defendant with an
actual relocation address.
Regardless of whether Rogers provided proper notice to Defendant of her
family's relocation, if Defendant objected to such relocation he did not adhere to
proper procedure for expressing any such concerns. U.C.A. § 30-3-37(2), in

13

pertinent part, provides that either party, or the court itself, may move tne court uto
review the notice of relocation and parent-time schedule.. .and make appropriate
orders." Based on Rogers' testimony, she attempted to tell Defendant, "as soon as
[Mr. Rogers] found out he had the job'' that they were relocating, but Defendant
was unwilling to listen. R.82:83. Rogers told the jury Mr. Rogers accepted the job
in Wyoming "towards mid-February" 2004. R.82.83. It follows that Defendant
had at least oral notice of Rogers' move and could have taken the appropriate steps
to gain audience with the civil court several weeks prior to the Rogers' relocation.
Instead, Defendant chose to file his Exparte Motion and Verified Petition in
both the Sixth and Third District Courts respectively, each containing meritless
allegations of danger and abuse towards Jaycee in an effort to retain her in his
custody. See SE4 and DE 11. Each document contains allegations in an attempt to
persuade the reviewing court to believe that Jaycee was in danger of harm or
injury. Apparently, based on the court's denials, the courts did not believe Jaycee
to be in such dire circumstances. In reality, underlying Defendant's baseless
allegations contained in both documents was Defendant's concern that Rogers was
leaving the area. Defendant did not react appropriately. Both courts flatly denied
Defendant's requests.
Thus, even if this Court finds that Rogers did not provide Defendant with
proper notice, the remedy is granting additional parent time to Defendant or even

14

contempt of court for Rogers, not a reversal of a criminal conviction. Conceivably,
if this court reversed Defendant's conviction on the basis of Rogers' alleged failure
to give proper notice of her relocation, a defendant in an analogous scenario, could
simply kidnap a child, then when captured, merely argue his innocence based on
the fact that his ex-spouse failed to give proper notice of her relocation. This Court
clearly does not intend such a result. When a non-custodial parent, such as
Defendant, does not adhere to appropriate judicial procedure and chooses instead
to take the law into his own hands that parent must be held accountable. This
Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JURY'S VERDICT BASED
ON ITS FINDING THAT CONSIDERING ALL CIRCUMSTANCES,
DEFENDANT RETAINED JAYCEE FOR A TIME
SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER THAN HIS PARENT TIME.
No question remains concerning whether or not Defendant filed his Verified

Petition with the Third District Court on March 18, 2004. As stated supra, the
Court denied said Petition within an hour. The State acknowledges that Defendant
may well have desired to "stand before the judge, be sworn, and give testimony"
about his concerns. Defs Brief at 17. Finally, the State agrees that Defendant
retained Jaycee from Rogers for a limited time period from March 18 to the 20 .
Defendant relies heavily on the 1980 decision rendered in Nielsen v.
Nielsen. 620 P.2d 511 (Utah 1980). Nielsen is a civil case. The facts in Nielsen
arose from the plaintiff father maintaining his child two days past his visitation
15

period from custodial mother, who had "an unstable history and although
professing an intention to change, had not done so." Id. at 512. Additionally,
mother had lived with two different men, neither of which was the father of two
younger, illegitimate children to whom she gave birth. Id. The mother was
unemployed, lived primarily on welfare and had been injured in an altercation with
one of her paramours. Id. Such events were traumatic to the child. Id. In
contrast, the non-custodial father and his wife were purchasing a home in a middleclass neighborhood, and had a contingent of extended family in the area that would
help in providing the child with positive influences. The question of the child's
custody rested on the best interests of the child.
The mother in Nielsen contended that because the father maintained the
child for two days beyond his defined visitation period, he could have been
charged with Custodial Interference pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-303. The Nielsen
court held that the father's detention beyond his visitation period did not fall under
the statute. The Court cited the father's "good faith belief that he had good cause,
which the father substantiated by filing a petition to modify as reasons validating
the father's behavior.
The case at bar is different from Nielsen. In the past year prior to the events
leading to this case, Defendant had filed at least three Order to Show Causes,
complaining about his weekend visitations. See SE 1:3. The reviewing court
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referred to Defendant's allegations in the three Orders as "not brought in good
faith" and the "allegations have no merit." Id. The jury was privy to such
information at trial. Defendant's filing of his Exparte Motion and Verified Petition
are little more than a continuation of Defendant's lack of good faith and merit.
The jury was privy to testimony from Rogers that when Defendant finally
established contact with her, after failing to return the child, he told her, "I'm not
bringin' [Jaycee] back." (sic.) R. 82:156. Defendant then hung up the phone. Id.
Defendant never contacted Rogers again after the call. Jaycee was never returned
to Rogers. Rogers had to travel to Salt Lake County to retrieve her daughter after
Defendant's arrest. R. 82: 113-4. Based solely on the information Rogers received
from Defendant via telephone, Defendant never intended to return Jaycee.
On various occasions Rogers encountered problems at her home with
Defendant when he came to pickup Jaycee. R. 82:88. In an attempt to curb such
problems, Rogers mounted a surveillance camera above her porch to record
Defendant's actions at the Rogers home. See SE 6. The aforementioned
examples, taken as a whole, and placed in context with Defendant withholding
Jaycee, provide sufficient basis for the jury's verdict that Defendant interfered by
holding Jaycee for a period substantially longer than allowed.
The Court of Appeals decided Nielsen nearly twenty-five years ago. Where
the Court found that substantial interference had not occurred given the facts and
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state of society at that time, we now live in a different society. Defendant retained
Jaycee for almost two days beyond the time when he usually returned her. See R.
82:113-4 83:76-7. Technically, in fact, Defendant never returned Jaycee. See ft.
82:113-4. We now live in a society where parents are encouraged to contact
authorities within hours when their child has been abducted. Such information is
now broadcast by virtue of a system sometimes referred to as an "Amber Alert," so
that a suspect can be located quickly via assistance from the general public.
Without doubt, a non-custodial parent who fails to return the child to the custodial
parent, then telephones the next day to tell a worried mother that "I'm not bringin'
[the child] back," (sic.) certainly interfered with Rogers' custody rights by
retaining Jaycee for a period substantially longer than his parent time. The jury,
considering the totality of the facts presented at trial, found that Defendant had
retained Jaycee for substantially longer than allowed.
Based on the above-cited reasons, the Court should disavow Defendant's
argument and uphold the jury verdict.
IV.

THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS WELL FOUNDED DUE TO
DEFENDANT NOT ONLY FILING ONE EX-PARTE PROTECTIVE
ORDER BUT ALSO FILING A SIMILAR PETITION IN A
DIFFERENT COURT ONLY DAYS BEFORE.
Defendant filed his Verified Petition in order to persuade the Third District

Court to allow him to maintain custody of Jaycee. DE 11. Judge Lindsley refused
Defendant's Petition within one-half hour of Defendant's filing. Defs Brief at 17.
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Certainly, if Despain posed a sincere threat of harm to Jaycee, based on allegations
of sexual misconduct from nearly twenty years earlier, the Court should have
granted Defendant's Petition.
However, Defendant neglects to inform this Court that not only did he file
the Verified Petition with the Third District Court on March 18 , but that mere
days earlier, on March 12, 2004, Defendant filed his Exparte Motion in the Sixth
District Court. SE 4. In both documents, Defendant presented several unsupported
and unsubstantiated allegations claiming that Jaycee was in danger of harm and
encouraging the Court to order Rogers to stay away from Jaycee, to remove any
right to Jaycee's custody from Rogers and grant Defendant custody. See SE 4 and
DE11.
The same day Defendant filed his Exparte Motion, Sixth District Court
Judge David Mower denied it. SE 5. Judge K.L. Mclff, Defendant's assigned
judge, confirmed Judge Mower's Order on March 17 . SE 5. Although the
Courts denied Defendant's Motions, this Court should know that in Defendant's
Verified Petition to the Third District, Defendant was not forthright in his filing.
In the Verified Petition, Defendant indicated to the Court that he had not filed for a
protective order in any other court of the State. See DE 11 at 3. Both the Exparte
Motion filed in the Sixth District and the Verified Petition filed in the Third
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District, and the misleading information Defendant included were pointed out to
the jury during Defendant's August trial. R. 83:113, 124-5.
Clearly, the jury had information that Defendant filed documents in the
Third and Sixth District Courts in an attempt to have either Court grant him
additional custody time with Jaycee. The evidence was unambiguous that three
judges, in both the Third and Sixth Districts, reviewed Defendant's filings and
denied them on each occasion. Thus, the jury possessed evidence beyond
Defendant's filing of his Verified Petition to support its verdict. Defendant
conveniently neglected to inform this Court of these filings. The Court should
deny Defendant's appeal and uphold the jury's verdict on this issue.
V.

THE COURT NEVER EXPUNGED THE CRIMINAL RECORD OF
THE MATERNAL STEPGRANDFATHER, WHO TWENTY YEARS
AGO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED A SEXUAL OFFENSE
AGAINST A MINOR.
The State does not dispute the fact that Rogers and her family engaged in

moving activities throughout the time period near March 10, 2004 up to and
beyond March 20, 2004. There is no question that the Rogers' packed several
items in boxes, then loaded them along with various items of furniture into a horse
trailer parked in front of their residence. R. 82:102-3. The State does not deny the
sparse lighting conditions at the Rogers' home when Defendant picked up Jaycee
on the evening of March 18 . R. 83:26. Finally, Despain was at the Rogers home
and presented Jaycee to Defendant upon his arrival. R. R. 83:27.
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During Defendant's trial, the defense attempted to introduce evidence in
support of his position that Rogers' stepfather, Despain, had been convicted of a
sexual offense involving a minor. R. 82: 121-2. The State never called Despain to
the witness stand at trial. During Defendant's cross examination of Rogers,
Defendant attempted to question her about her knowledge of Despain's criminal
history. The State objected based on Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (2004).
The Court sustained the State's objection. R. 82:122.
Rogers testified that, during her marriage to Defendant, her mother and
Despain got along fine with Defendant. R. 82:71. Specifically, Rogers testified
that "[Defendant and Despain] seemed to get along fine." R.82:72. Rogers also
testified that, following the parties' divorce, Despain answered the door countless
times when Defendant came to pick up Jaycee. R. 82:173. Defendant never
provided any evidence to refute Rogers' testimony. The question becomes, what
evidence did Defendant introduce at trial to support his contention that Despain
presented a threat to Jaycee or that Despain in fact was a convicted sex offender?
Defendant never introduced any evidence at trial to support the notion that
Clayton Despain presented a threat to Jaycee. The only evidence presented to the
jury was that Jaycee considered Despain her "Poppa," that Jaycee had a good
relationship with Despain and, in fact, that Defendant picked up Jaycee for
visitation from Despain on countless occasions. Instead, Defendant relied on bare
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and unsupported conjecture that at some past occasion a court expunged a sexual
offense from Despain's criminal record. To date, the State does not believe the
Defendant understands the actual nature of events surrounding the alleged
expungement of Despain's criminal record.
Subsequent to Defendant's trial, the State researched the Sixth District Court
records to ascertain the veracity of Defendant's claim. Such records are deemed
public records. The State learned that the State of Utah filed criminal case number
1402 ("case number 1402"), thereby accusing Despain of First Degree Rape on
January 11, 1984. (Addendum B). The alleged event occurred nearly five months
earlier on or before August 16, 1983. (Id.). At that time, Despain had recently
turned twenty-four years of age. (See birth date in Addendum C).
On February 15, 1984, subject to plea negotiations, the State agreed to
amend the charge in case number 1402 against Despain to reflect "Unlawful
Sexual Intercourse," a third degree felony, to which Despain entered a plea of no
contest. (Addendum D). On March 24, 1984, the Sixth District Court sentenced
Despain in case number 1402 to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison, but suspended
the sentence in favor of Despain being placed on supervised probation, which
required him to serve ninety days in the Sanpete County Jail. (Addendum E).
Despain was allowed to serve the ninety days sometime during the next year and
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allowed the privilege of work release. (Addendum E). The State fined Despain
$1,000.00. (Addendum E).
In exchange for Despain's no contest plea in case number 1402, and subject
to his successful completion of probation, the State agreed to allow Despain to
withdraw his "no contest" plea and enter a "not guilty plea," additionally, the State
agreed that at that juncture, it would dismiss the felony charge in case number
1402 against Despain. (Addendum E).
On August 20, 1985, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole
submitted a report to the Sixth District Court, reporting that Despain successfully
completed his probationary period for case number 1402 and recommended that
Despain's probation be terminated. (Addendum F). On or about October 9, 1985,
Sixth District Court Judge Don V. Tibbs signed an Order in case number 1402
terminating Despain's Probation. (Addendum G).
Seventeen years later, after successfully completing his probation in case
number 1402, on June 24, 2002, Despain filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
& Dismiss in the Sixth District Court. (Addendum H). On July 7, 2002, Sixth
District Judge, K.L. Mclff, signed an Order of Dismissal in case 1402, which, in
accord with the plea negotiations entered into by Despain and the State, granted
Defendant the benefit of withdrawing his guilty plea and having all charges
dismissed with prejudice. (Addendum I). In effect, Despain stands an innocent
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man, having no record of sexual impropriety on his criminal record. Additionally,
contrary to Defendant's contentions, Judge K.L. Mclff never expunged
Defendant's record. Thus, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury's verdict, and the
arguments set forth in this Brief, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^

day of May, 2005.

ROSS C. BLACKHAM
Sanpete. Cpunty Attorney

KEISEL
Deputy Sanpete County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed to JOHN D. SORGE, attorney for
Defendant/Appellant, 299 South Main Street, 13th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, on this the

/ r ~ d a y of May, 2005
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-5-303. Custodial interference.
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custo
dial inteiference if, without good cause, the actor takes,
entices, conceals, or detains a child under the age of 16 from
its paient, guardian, or other lawful custodian
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so, and
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substan
tially longer than the parent time or custody period
previously awaided by a court of competent jurisdiction
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custo
dial interference if, having actual physical custody of a child
under the age of 16 pursuant to a judicial award of any court
of competent jurisdiction which grants to another person
parent time, visitation, or custody rights, and without good
cause the actor conceals or detains the child with intent to
deprive the other person of lawful parent time, visitation, or
custody rights
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless
the child is removed and taken from one state to another, in
which case it is a felony of the third degree
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-2a-3. C o m t of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Couit of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex
traordinaiy writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to c a n y into effect its judgments, oiders, and de
crees, or
(b) in aid of its junsdiction
(2) The Couit of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final ordeis and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals fiom
the district court review of infoimal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Ti ust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive directoi of the Department of Natuial Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district couit review of
(1) adjudicative pioceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state 01 other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section
63 46a 12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) mteilocutory appeals fiom any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degiee or capital felony,
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony,
(i) appeals from oiders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a fiist
degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from the oiders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degiee or capital felony,
(h) appeals from district couit involving domestic rela
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul
ment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
d) appeals fiom the Utah Military Court, and
(j) cases tiansferred to the Court of Appeals fiom the
Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of foui judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Couit for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction
(4) l h e Court of Appeals shall comply with the require
ments of Title 63, Chaptei 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its leview of agency adjudicative proceedings
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

30-3-37. Relocation.
(1) When either parent decides to move fiom the state of
Utah or 150 miles oi more fiom the lesidence specified in the
couit's decree, that paient shall provide if possible 60 days
advance written notice of the intended relocation to the other
parent The written notice of relocation shall contain state
ments affirming the following
(a) the paient time piovisions in Subsection (5) or a
schedule appioved by both paities will be followed, and
(b) neither parent will inteifere with the other's paren
tal rights pursuant to court oidered parent tune ariange
ments, or the schedule appioved by both parties
(2) The court may, upon motion of any paity oi upon the
couits own motion, schedule a hearing with notice to leview
the notice of ielocation and paient time schedule as provided
in Section 30 3 35 and make appiopnate oiders icgaiding the
parent time and costs foi parent time ti ansportation
(3) In determining the parent time schedule and allocating
the transportation costs, the couit shall consider
(a) the reason for the patent's ielocation,
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both paients in
exercising paient time,
(c) the economic resources of both parents, and
(d) other factors the couit considers necessary and
lelevant
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court may oidei the
parent intending to move to pay the costs of transportation for
(a) at least one visit per year with the othei parent, and
lb) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the coui t
(5) Unless otherwise oidered by the court, upon the relocation of one of the paities the following schedule shall be the
minimum requirements for paient time with a school age
child
(a) in jears ending m an odd number, the child shall
spend the following holidays with the noncustodial parent
d) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday
until Sunday, and
(n) the fall school bieak, if applicable, beginning
the last da> of school before the holiday until the day
before school resumes,
(b) in yeais ending in an even number, the child shall
spend the following holidays with the noncustodial parent
(l) the entne winter school bieak period, and

(n) Spnng bieak beginning the last day of school
before the holiday until the day before school re
sumes, and
(c) extended paient time equal to Vfe of the summer oi
ofT track time foi consecutive weeks r Ihe week before
school begins may not be counted as pait of the summer
period
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the court may oider
uninteirupted paient time with the noncustodial paient for a
minimum of 30 days during extended parent time, unless the
court finds it is not in the best inteiests of the child If the
court oiders uninteirupted paient time dining a penod not
covered by this section, it shall specify in its oider which
parent is responsible foi the child's tiavel expenses
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the couit the relocating
party shall be responsible for all the child's travel expenses
relating to Subsections (5 Ha) and (b) and xh of the child s travel
expenses relating to Subsection <5Kc), piovided the noncusto
dial party is cuirent on all suppoit obligations If the noncus
todial paity has been found in contempt foi not being cuirent
on all support obligations, he shall be lesponsible for all of the
child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless the couit
rules otherwise Reimbursement by either lesponsible paity
to the other for the childs tiavel expenses shall be made
within 30 days of teceipt of documents detailing those ex
penses
(8) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting
decree of divorce
(9) Any action under this section may be set for an expe
dited hearing
(10) A paient who fails to comply with the notice of relocation in Subsection (1) shall be in contempt of the couit's order
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 401. Character e v i d e n c e not admissible to p r o v e
c o n d u c t ; e x c e p t i o n s ; other c r i m e s .
(a) Character evidence generally Evidence of a person's
chaiacter or a trait of chaiacter is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in confoimity therewith on a particular occasion, except
(a)(1) Charactet of accustd Evidence of a pertinent trait of
chaiacter offered bv an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of
the accused offered by the prosecution,
(a)(2) Chaiactei of alleged victim Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by
an accused, or by the piosecution to lebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor,
(a)(3) Character of witness Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609
(b) Other crimes, wiongs, or CH ts Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs oi acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith It may,
however, be admissible for other pui poses, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake oi accident, provided that upon
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide leasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM
Sanpete County Attorney
Bank of Ephrairn Building
Ephraim, Utah
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Telephone:
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SANPETF COUNTY,UTAH

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND. R|& ^RN$$T]8 C&&NTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff
vs.

*

*
*

CLAYTON DESPAIN

*

Defendant

INFORMATION
Criminal No.

/jfoA^

*

The Defendant herein, Clayton Despain, having been duly bound over to
this Court by Louis G. Tervort, Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court in and for
Sanpete County, State of Utah, pursuant to a preliminary hearing on the 5th day
of January, 1984, to answer to the charges by the State of Utah, and the Defendant
having been present at the time appointed for preliminary hearing and represented
by his attorney, Michael Labrum, Richfield, Utah.
Now, therefore, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, accuses the
Defendant of Rape contrary to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-5-402, and
charges that:
On or before August 16, 1983, in Centerfield, Utah, Defendant
did have sexual intercourse with another person, not the Defendantfs
spouse, and without the person's consent, to-wit: Mary Moore, a
First Degree Felony.
In violation of law and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
Mary Moore, Cathy Anderson.
DATED this 11th day of January, 1984.

10SS C. BLACKHAM
Sanpete County Attorney
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UTAH ARREST AND COURT DISPOSITION REPORT
tAST

MIDDLE

FIRST

ARRESTING AGENCY I D

DESPAIR. Clayton W.
ALIASES.

LAST

RESIDENCE-

MICROFILM REEL AND FRAME

UT020000a

FIRSt

MIDDLE

CDR NO

AbbL

UBI NO

YOUR FILE NO

Box 139 . Cantarfield, UT 84622

CONTRIBUTING AGENCY I D.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

FBI NO

UT0200000

Yi-L.

OCCUPATION

SIGNATURE OF PERSON-TAKING FINGERPRINTS
YOUR FILE NO
PLACE OF BIRTH

DATE OF BIRTH

12/12/83

08/04/59
SEX

SCARS, MARKS, TATTOOS, AND AMP

DAT! OF ARREST

HGT

RACE

M

f

56

T40

W

Snail acara on hands

AGENCY NEXT APPEAR.

EYES

hatal
INITIAL CHARGE DESCRIPTION

DATt OF OFFENSE

08/16/83

Xap*

Codmi

76-5-402

Arrest Disposition
U Rel - No Formol Charge 207
D Rel on Boil or own Recog. 206

ARREST DISP. DATE

NCIC CODE

D Rel to Other Agency 208
Q Ref to Juvenile Auth 212
D Dismissed W / O Trial 207

D No Bill Returned
Q Held 205
D Deceased 202

211

D

Other.

CITY/JP ARRAIGNMENT SECTION
1 NCIC AGENCY ID
| cM

1

CASE N O .

PLEA

PROSECUTOR
DISPOSITION

1

D
D

Guilty
Not Guilty

D
U

Prosecute
Declined

2

D Guilty
D Not Guilty

D
D

Prosecute
Declined

3

Q Guilty
D Not Guilty

D
D

Prosecute
Declined

1 °

RELEASE DATE:

ARRAIGNMENT DATE

D O w n Recognizance
O Bail

RELEASE A O I O N :

NCIC
CODE

CHANGE IN CHARGE DESCRIPTION

n

D

Committed in Default

D Committed Without Bail

2

BAIL/BOND AMOUNT

13

1

$

14

O Other

CITY/JP PRELIMINARY HEARING SECTION
| DATE OF HEARING

AGENCY REFERRED TO

[c

|1

D
D

Dismissed O Red. to Misd.
Bound Over a Ref. os Misd

2

D
D

Dismissed O Red.to Misd.
Bound Over D Ref as Misd

3

D
O

Dismissed D Red.to Misd.
Bound Over D Ref. os Misd

NCIC
CODE

CHANGE IN CHARGE DESCRIPTION

RESULTS OF HEARING

N
O

DISTRICT COURT ARRAIGNMENT SECTION
1 NCIC COURT CODE

CASE N O .

FILING DATE

TYPE FILINGD Information

D Grand Jury

D Other

c
M
O

1

D
a

2

O Guilty
D Not Guilty

3

D
D

NCIC
CODE

CHANGE IN CHARGE DESCRIPTION

PLEA
Guilty
Not Guilty

Guilty
Not Guilty

ALL COURTS DISPO SITION SECTION
TYPE TRIAL

DATE TRIAL BEGINS

TYPS COUNSEL
n

e^u

n s*k*L_.

DATE TRIAL ENDS
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Addendum D

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF

SAHPrTL

STATE OF UTAH

Date
'' 1 ' ^ i v l
Case No. '' V): '

DON V. TIBBS, Judge
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter

Ouuye L o u i s G. T e r v o r l , Pi <?<jidin.'

TITLE (Parties Present)

COUNSEL (Counsel Present)

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Ross

-vs-

f_

ulackham. Attorney f o r l»lf.

Marcus Tavlor, Ailorney aI I <->w. Appearing

CLAYTON Dl SPAIN,

for Michael l.abnim, A U < » ' K - / for Uefendant.
Defendant.
MINUTE ENTRY

Proceedings Before the Court
ARRAIGNMENT

Plea bargaining lias been entered i n t o .

(
(
(
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DIVORCE
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
PROBATE
CRIMINAL
ADOPTION
OTHER

Defendant, o r i g i n a l l y charged w i t h rapp.

Changed to "Unlawful Sexual Intercoursn" a Lhnd Degr°o f f l o n y .

Iirlondani advised

of hib r i g h t s , and ppi TPQ a plea at t h i ^ Hive of "no l o n f - ' s t " .

A iV* '.«>n'ontr

r r p o r t w i l l lie made print- t o sentencing ?n March 14, MH'A, al lf>:°0 /". P!
Defendant i > out on own

recogni^inc 1 ,
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FILED
Si.NPET- ^M*'TY f UTAH

ROSS C. BLACKHAM
Sanpete County Attorney
Bank of Ephraim Building
Ephraim, Utah 34627
Telephone:

W I1AR 11 AH 9 49

283-4646
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF , k N ^ P ' C ^ S f t C ^ J f '
STATE OF UTAH

a

^

UO

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION

vs,
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN

Criminal No. 1402

Defendant

OFFENSE: Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, a Third Degree Felony, No Contest Plea
APPEARANCES:

Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, and Michael Labrum,
Attorney for Defendant.

No legal reason having been shown why Judgment should not be pronounced,
it is the judgment of the Court as follows:
The Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison and fined the sum of $5,000.00. The prison sentence and
all but $1,000.00 of the fine is suspended and Defendant is placed on probation
to the Department of Adult Probation and Parole for a period of 18 months; the
suspension of sentence and the probation being conditioned on the following terms:
1. That Defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation and Parole
and comply by the terms and condition thereof.
2. Defendant shall be required to report to Adult Probation and Parole and to
the Court whenever requested.
3. Defendant shall serve 90 days in the Sanpete County Jail provided,
however, that a regular work-release program is authorized provided suitable
arrangements a^e made with the Sanpete County Sheriff and provided that the 90
days are actually served within a period of one year's time. Further, that in

-2the event Defendant wishes to serve h i s 90 days i n the Sevier County J a i l and
arrangements can be made t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Sanpete County S h e r i f f i s

authorized

t o t r a n s f e r Defendant to Sevier County J a i l and t h a t Defendant i s ordered to
assume and pay a l l costs o f i n c a r c e r a t i o n charged to Sanpete County f o r any
t r a n s f e r t o t h e Sevier County J a i l .
4.

Defendant s h a l l have no a s s o c i a t i o n or contact o f any k i n d w i t h the

v i c t i m i n t h i s case.
5.

Defendant shall abstain from a l l

i n t o x i c a n t s o f any k i n d ,

including

w i n e , beer and l i q u o r .
6.

Defendant s h a l l take no c o n t r o l l e d substances except as prescribed

by a l i c e n s e d p h y s i c i a n .
7.
and l a w f u l
8.

Defendant s h a l l not c o h a b i t a t e w i t h any female not Defendant's legal
wife.
Defendant s h a l l not associate w i t h anyone convicted o f a f e l o n y or w i t h

anyone on p a r o l e .
9.
10.

Defendant shall not frequent or v i s i t any bars or t a v e r n s .
Defendant

s h a l l pay the remaining $1,000.00 f i n e on a monthly basis

i n such sums as are arranged w i t h A d u l t Probation and Parole and the same s h a l l be
paid w i t h i n a p e r i o d o f one year.
11.

Defendant shall no v i o l a t e any c i t y , county, s t a t e or other law.

12.

I f Defendant successfully completes the probation as described h e r e i n ,

the Court w i l l , upon

motion by Defendant or his a t t o r n e y , allow Defendant to

withdraw the g u i l t y plea and enter a Not G u i l t y plea and t h e r e a f t e r dismiss the
charges and case against the Defendant.
13.

That d u r i n g the term o f his probation Defendant s h a l l s t r i c t l y comply

w i t h support o b l i g a t i o n s owed to c h i l d r e n / w i f e from his former marriage and/or any
;he O
cw <angements or agreements heretofore entered i n t o with the
Offff ii cc ee ^of jf t eRecovery
c o very
Services f o r the reimbursement o f same.
DATED t h i s

2 ^ V day of March, 1984.

8«*

VW^J^' / 7 &
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STATE OF UTAH

Judge

ADULT PROBATION \ND PAROLE
STAY REPORT
FILED
3ANPE^: r ^ ' D A T E ^ , ,
DON V. TIBBS, Sixth District Court, Sanpete rmmt-'y

Name

DESPAIN, Clayton William

—
Offense

"

File No.

1402

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. Third Deefrfee ^ e l o n y ^ . vitPteced on Probation
Box 139, Centerfield, Utah

1985

'85 (JIT 9 Pft If Ift

B Y

Address

August 20,

84622

3/14/84

^^W^FPUJY
<date>
Employment Cox Rock Products

Comments: Mr. Despain resides in Centerfield, Utah, and i s employed by Cox Rock Products
as a mechanic. He has had t h i s employment for the l a s t four years. He has paid his f i n e
i n f u l l . No negative reports have been received concerning him. I t i s respectfully
recommended that he be terminated from probation.

Recommendations: TERMINATION
( ) Instructed to appear
(X) Recommend appearance be excused

CL/SO&LL„ <T. ^ £ < f e ^ d
William E. Strode, District Agent
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY ' • ' -
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STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
MOTION AND ORDER TERMINATING
PROBATION

vs.

Criminal No. 1402

CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN
Defendant

The State of Utah, through the Sanpete County Attorney, hereby moves
the above entitled Court for an Order Terminating the Probation of the Defendant,
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN

, and releasing him

from the terms of

his

probation agreement with Adult Probation and Parole pursuant to an Order of
the Court dated

March 26, 1984

.

The basis for this motion is that Defendant has satisfactorily complied
with the terms of

his

probation for the required period of time, and has

paid all fines required in full and Adult Probation and Parole has recommended
and requested that the probation be terminated and Defendant released therefrom.
D'NTED this

9th

day of

October

,1985

.

Motion and Order Terminating Probation
Criminal No»
1402
page 2

13 IR £ £ £

Pursuant to the motion of Sanpete County Attorney, and upon request
and recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole, and the Court finding the
Defendant has satisfactorily complied with the terms of
agreement and

his

his

probation

probation in this matter should be terminated;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN
of

his

, is hereby released from the terms

probation agreement and probation in this matter is hereby

terminated.
DATED this

9th

day of

October

1985
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Defendant
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435)835-5055
Facsimile: (435)835-5057
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

:

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEA & DISMISS

:

vs.

:

Case No. 1402

CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN

:

JUDGE

Defendant.

:

COMES NOW the Defendant, Clayton William Despain, by and through his counsel,
Douglas L. Neeley, and hereby moves this Court to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea and enter
an order of dismissal with prejudice of the above-entitled matter. This motion is based and
supported upon the following:
1. That the Defendant plead guilty and a Judgment & Order of Probation was entered on or
about the 27th day of March, 1984. (See copy of attached Judgment & Order of Probation marked
as Exhibit "A".)

2. That pursuant to the Judgment & Order of Probation, the Defendant was required to fulfill
certain obligations and refrain from further law violations. Further, the Defendant was ordered to
fulfill a jail term, pay a fine, and comply strictly with all terms of a probationary agreement with
Adult Probation and Parole.
3. That the Defendant did strictly comply with all the terms and conditions of his probation
and Adult Probation and Parol recommended a successful termination. (See copy of Adult Parole
and Probation recommendation marked and attached as Exhibit "B".)
4. That based upon the Defendant's successful completion of all probationary terms, the
State of Utah, per County Attorney Ross C. Blackham, moved this Court for an order of successful
completion of probation. On or about October 9, 1985, the Court signed an Order. (See copy of
Motion & Order Terminating Probation marked and attached as Exhibit "C".)
5. That the original Judgment & Order at paragraph no. 12 allowed for the Defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea and a dismissal of the charges if he successfully complied with all terms of
his probation.
6. That over seventeen (17) years have now passed and the Defendant continues to remain
a good father, provider, grandfather, and law abiding citizen.
DATED this <% V

day of June, 2002.

DOUGLAS L. NEELEY
NEELE
Attorney for Defendant

Addendum I
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Defendant
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435)835-5055
Facsimile: (435)835-5057
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IN THE SLXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 1402

CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN

JUDGE

Defendant.

BASED upon the motion and stipulation of the parties, and for good cause showing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. That the Defendant's plea of guilty is hereby withdrawn.
2. That all charges in this matter are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

(

day of Jtme7^D02.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
•d&e=

ROSS C. BLACKHAM
Sanpete County Attorney

